Authentication watermarking is the process that inserts hidden data into an object (image) in order to detect any fraudulent alteration perpetrated by a malicious hacker. In the literature, quite a small number of secure authentication methods are available for binary images. This paper proposes a new secure authentication watermarking method for binary images. It can detect any visually significant alteration while maintaining good visual quality. As usual, the security of the algorithm lies on the secrecy of a private-key. Only its owner can insert the correct watermark while anyone may verify the authenticity through the corresponding public-key. A possible application of the proposed technique is in internet fix transmission, i.e. for legal authentication ofdocuments routed outside the phone network.
INTRODUCTION
A watermark is a hidden signal added to images that can be detected or extracted later to make some assertion about the host image. Watermarking techniques can be classified as either "robust" or "fragile." Robust watcrmarks cannot be easily removed and should resist common imagemanipulation procedures. They are useful for copyright and ownership assertion purposes. Fragile watcrmarks (or authentication watermarks) are easily corrupted by any image processing procedure. Watermarks for checking image integrity can be fragile because if the watermark is removed, the watermark detection algorithm will correctly report a corruption of the image.
In the literature, there are many authentication watermarking techniques (AWTs) for continuous-tone images [19, 18, 15, 16, 12, 2, IO, 31 . However, quite a small number o f secure AWT is available for binary images. We mean by "secure AWT" a scheme where the security does not lie on the secrecy of thc algorithm but only on the secrecy of the key. The watermarking algorithm and the fact that an image is watermarked may be made public without compromising the security. Hence, a secure AWT may rely upon cryptography. Moreover, a sccure AWT must detect any visually significant change made to an image.
In a typical cryptography-based AWT an authentication signaturc (AS) is computed from the whole image data and inserted into the image itself. In cryptography, AS is called message authentication code (using secret-key) or digital signature (using public/private-key). AS contains information about the image contents that may be checked to verify its integity. However, inserting the AS into the image alters the image itself, hence modifying its AS and invalidating the watermark. Typically, the information has to be somehow divided into at least two parts: a portion to maintain the image integrity and another portion to cany the AS. Although there are many papers on data hiding in binary images [13, 6, I , 5,4, 17,7, 8, 141 , therc are only a few cryptography-based AWTs for binary imagcs. Fu and Au [9] present a watermarking to detect unintentional changes in halftone images, but this cannot be considered to be an AWT because it does not withstand intcntional or malicious attacks. Kim and Afif 1111 present a cryptography-based AWT hut it is especially suited for dispersed-dot halftone images and the visual quality for a generic binary image is poor. In this paper, we propose a new cryptography-based secure AWT for binary images that has good visual quality when applicd to a generic binary image. It can be used in conjunction with secret-key or publiciprivate-key cryptography. A possible use of our method is to send faxes and documcnts over uncontrolled networks and the internet. In this case, the receiver of a documcnt can verify the document integrity (for a given originator).
DATA HIDING INTO BINARY IMAGES
As we noted in previous section, there arc many data hiding techniques for binary images. Among them, an interesting technique, we name template ranking, was discovered by De Queiroz et al. [5] and independently by Wu et al. [ 171. It can be applied to most binary images with excellent visual quality. It can be summarized as follows: 1) Divide the image Z to be marked into small blocks (say, 8x8).
2) The neighborhood of each pixel (usually a 3x3 template) is analyzcd to rate its visual significance. This is done via template ranking where the 512 3x3 binary templates are 0-7803-8554-3/04/S20.00 02004 IEEE.
ranked (uniquely associated with a number from 0 to 5 I I) as in figure 1. Mirrors, transposes and reverses of each pattern have similar ranks, cvcn though thcy were not shown. Also, there are a number of pattcms that wcre not inclhded for a particular rcason: thcy might break existing objects and that might be objectionable in some applications. The reader can re-include them if ncccssary.
3) Insert onc bit in cach block by forcing the block to have even or odd number of white pixels, to insert bits 0 or 1 rcspcctivcly. If the block already has the desired parity, it is left untouched. Otherwise, flip the pixel with the highest rank. This pixel is supposcd to havc the lowest visibility. 4) As different blocks may have different quantities of low visibility pixels, it is suggested to shuffle image Z before embedding data. Fig. 1: 3x3 tcmplates ranked from lei? to right, top to bottom. Mirrors, transposes and reverses of each pattern havc the same rank, even though they were not includcd here. Templates not shown have lower ranking.
AUTHENTICATING BINARY IMAGES
The above data hiding tcchnique can be employed in a secure AWT for binary images. That was hinted [I71 but not elaborated before.
The idea of computing an AS of the whole binary image and inserting it into the same imagc fails because the insertion will modify the image fingerprint. The first idea to insert the AS without modifying the image fingerprint is to divide the image into two regions: the first (small) region where AS will be inserted, and the second (large) region from where AS will be computed. Let us write this idea algorithmically: 1) Let be given a binary image Z. Using a pseudo-random number generator with a seed, construct an auxiliary data structure called shuffling vector V, so that the image Z can be viewed as a completely shuffled sequence of pixels z" .
In the secret-key version of our technique, the secret-key is used as the seed of the pseudo-random generator. In the publiciprivate-key .version, the seed must be made public.
2) Let n be the length of the adopted AS, and m be the number of pixels of each block. Divide the shuffled sequence 2 into two regions:
First region 2, : nxm pixels, where AS is to he stored. This region is subdivided into n blocks with m pixels. In each block, one bit of AS will be inserted.
Second region
: the remainder of the shuffled sequence 2. The insertion algorithm will compute AS of this region. 3) Using a cryptographically secure hashing fiinction H, compute the fingerprint of the second region H = H ( T 2 ) . Cryptograph the fingerprint H using a secret-or private-key, obtaining an AS: S = K ( H ) . 4) Insert S into the tirst region, obtaining the wetermarked image Z' . Insert one bit of S in each block as previously described. . . Fig. 2c : Region defining map: black pixels belong to region 1, while white ones to region 2.
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We remark here that AS cannot be made too short without compromising seriously the security. Usually, a message authentication code 128 bits long is considered secure. The most well-known digital signature, RSA, is considered secure with 1024 bits. A newer scheme, DSA, is considered secure. with 320 bits. The verification algorithm of a watermarked image 2' is straightforward: I) Compute the same shuffling vector V used in the insertion. Note that in the secret-key version, the secret-key is also the seed of the random number generator and consequently only the owner of the key can reconstnict the shuffling vector. However, in the public-key version, the seed is public and consequently the shuffling vector is public.
2) Divide Z' in two regions Z; and Z i , in the same way as done in the insertion step. Compute the fingerprint H of Z; . 3) Extract the AS stored in Z; and decrypt it using the secret-or public-key, obtaining the check data D. 4) If D = H , the watermark is verified. Otherwise, image Z' was modified or a wrong key was used. Figure 2(a) depicts a zoom of a magazine page scanned at 300 dpi, which can be considered a "typical" binary document. Figure 2(b) is the corresponding image aHer embedding 1024 hits using 64-pixel blocks.
PARITY ATTACK
The proposed method detects any alteration perpetrated to the second region of a watermarked image, even to a single pixel. Indeed, the probability of not detecting an alteration in this region is only 2-", which can be neglected (n is the length of the AS).
Unfortunately, any alteration that maintains the parities of blocks in the first region cannot be detected. For example, if two pixels that belong to the same block change their values, the parity of this block does not change and this modification will pass undetected. We named this a "parity attack." If the watermarked image Z' is large enough, the pixels of Z,' constitute isolated pixels randomly dispersed in the image Z' and it is unlikely that a malicious attacker can introduce any visually significant alteration in Z' , changing only pixels of Z; (while maintaining the parity of all blocks). For example, in figure 2c, black pixels belong to region I and they are quite dispersed. Thus no visually meaningful alteration will result by modifying only region 1 pixels.
However, if the image 2' is small, the pixels of Z; can form contiguous regions in Z ' , what arises the possibility of successfill visually significant modifications that will pass undetected. For example, figure 3(a) is an image of a ballot ticket and figure 3(b) is the same image aAer marking. Figure 3(c) shows pixels that belong to region 1 in black. Any region I pixel can he modified, provided that another pixel in the same block is also modified. To obtain a faked image, a malicious hacker changes a pixel p of block i. Then, he looks for the pixel within the block i with the highest rank and flips its value. Figure 3(d) shows a faked image constructed by repeating this idea. This alteration Will pass undetected by the proposed algorithm. e Black pixelsbelong to region I, where parity attack can be mounted.
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Maria Pereira I Fig. 3d : Faked image generated by the parity attack, undetectable by the first version of our algorithm. Actually, the scenario described above only applies to the public-key version of the algorithm, where the locations of regions I and 2, as well as the subdivisions of region I into blocks are publicly known. In the secret-key version of the algorithm, we do not have to worry much about a parity attack, because the secret-key is used to generate the shuffling vector. So, an attacker will not know how the watermarked image is divided into regions 1 and 2, and how region I is subdivided into blocks. However, we have to pay some attention to this potential attack because the attacker may have many different ways to obtain "clues" about the location of regions and blocks. For example, let us suppose that the attacker has access to a database of original and marked binary documents, all of the same size and all watermarked using the same secret-key. Then it will be known that all those pixels whose values are different in the original and the watermarked version images belong to region I .
IMPROVED ALGORITHM T O DEFEND AGAINST PARITY ATTACKS
In order to minimize the possibility of a parity attack, we suggest the following improvement of the step 4 of the insertion algorithm: 4) Insert S into the first region using the following algorithm, obtaining the watermarked image 2' : This way, block n-l still can suffer a parity attack. However, if block n-2 is modified without modi@ing its parity, with 50% of chance this modification will he detected. If block n-3 is modified (maintaining its parity), there is 75% of chance of detecting this change. If block 0 is changed (maintaining its parity), there is a probability of 1 -2-'"-" of detecting this change. The improved algorithm certainly makes it much more difficult to be subject to a parity attack.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed a new cryptographically secure authentication watermarking for binary images. It can he used with secret-or publidprivate-key cipher. We also derived a variant of the algorithm that is able to withstand parity attacks. The proposed technique is suitable to watermark most binary images except dispersed-dot halftones.
The method using a public/private-key can be used in trusted FAX machines, i.e. to electronically sign binary documents. Further research is necessary to adapt the method to scanned documents.
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